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Hazards of ‘Final’ Definition
These comments are coming from a gen-
eral hospital psychiatrist who uses hypnosis, 
especially in the treatment of disorders with 
an autohypnotic component.  I strongly en-
dorse the central idea that ‘hypnosis’ should 
reference an altered state of consciousness.  
Semantics
I would maintain the primary meaning of 
hypnosis as an altered state of consciousness, 
and then test hypotheses around that defini-
tion to discover the ‘boundaries’ of that al-
tered state.  Wagstaff (this issue) does this to 
some extent in his paper, but seeking a ‘final’ 
or ‘exact’ definition is a hazardous undertak-
ing, both semantic and empirical.  
The semantic hazard appears when 
Wagstaff quotes the Oxford English 
Dictionary’s definition of ‘definition’ as “a 
statement of the exact meaning of a word, es-
pecially in a dictionary.” This implies a fatal 
element of self-reference, which could invite 
the addendum: “.  .  . this definition of ‘defi-
nition’ is its most exact meaning because it 
is printed here, in this best of all extant dic-
tionaries!” We are ‘threatened’ by such im-
plicit self-reference all the time, but while it 
trips up artificial intelligence every time, we 
routinely evade the danger by intuiting what 
we mean by a word, regardless of its ‘exact 
definition’.  
The empirical hazard arises to the ex-
tent that every definition conceals a latent 
hypothesis, and no hypothesis about ‘real-
ity’ can claim to be either ‘final’ or ‘exact’. 
If the hypothesis later proves to be false (e.g. 
if later thinking abandons ‘altered state of 
consciousness’ as a cogent concept), then we 
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would be faced with two alternatives: that the 
word refers to something which doesn’t exist 
(e.g., ‘Santa Claus’ or ‘unicorn’), or else up-
date its ‘final’ definition — so much for ‘final’. 
Lavoisier named oxygen ‘oxygen’ to connote 
‘acid-producing’, but when acids were subse-
quently found not to require oxygen, chem-
ists didn’t then scramble to find a new word 
for the gas they were already familiar with.  
In any case, I find Wagstaff’s struggle 
with definition to be surprisingly illuminat-
ing, compelling, entertaining, etc., but espe-
cially sobering.  Much is clarified along the 
way.
I am genuinely ambivalent about 
Wagstaff’s final definition of hypnosis either 
as “1) an alleged altered state of conscious-
ness” or as “2) acceptance of the suggestion 
.  .  .” (p. 102)  On the one hand, I find both 
arms of the definition lame (‘alleged’ and ‘ac-
ceptance of the suggestion’) and on the other 
I am gratified that this rigorous attempt to 
formulate a final definition (of anything pur-
porting to be real) has failed.
We intend our words to designate real 
entities or phenomena, apart from how accu-
rately they do so.  In facing a patient, I intend 
my listing of their signs and symptoms to ac-
curately designate objective and subjective 
aspects of their lived experience; I intend that 
the disorder named (the diagnosis) designate 
a real pathological entity, apart from how 
successful it is at doing so.  
Consequently, I intend that ‘hypnosis’ 
designate a real state of consciousness which 
is different from the average expectable alert 
waking state, and which might be ‘trumped’ 
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by certain other states such as those con-
ventionally labelled as delirious, demented, 
obtunded, asleep, comatose, etc., but which 
could cut across certain other waking states, 
such as sleepy, hypervigilent, frightened, an-
gry, depressed, rueful, etc.  
And so I intend that ‘hypnosis’ name a 
particular kind of altered state of conscious-
ness, but not an alleged altered state of con-
sciousness.  An alleged seizure or a subject’s 
absolute conviction about having had one 
would not suffice to distinguish a real sei-
zure from a pseudoseizure.  Objective indi-
cators of altered states of consciousness are, 
of course, more subtle than, say, epileptic 
patterns on the EEG, but physiological indi-
cators and advances in brain imaging may 
well become as clear for hypnotic states as 
the EEG is for a seizure.  And just as there 
are a variety of EEGs for a variety of seizures, 
there may well be a variety of indicators for 
various altered states of consciousness which 
would map out what a hypnotic state and a 
meditative state have in common, and how 
they differ.   
Clinical practice
In clinical practice, the reality of a hypnotic 
state is generally judged by the whole prac-
tical context of the encounter: the quality 
of the working alliance, what is required to 
induce a hypnotic state (rapidity, pacing, 
repetition), what can be accomplished in the 
hypnotic state, what is required to re-alert 
from the hypnotic state (again, rapidity, rep-
etition, pacing), and the quality of recall of 
the hypnotic state upon realerting.  What 
can be accomplished in the hypnotic state 
varies according to the presenting problems 
and psychic structure of the subject, as this 
can vary especially in the case of Dissociative 
Identity Disorder, one the most severe auto-
hypnotic (dissociative) diagnoses.
Other diagnoses, such as PTSD, 
Somatoform Disorder, other Dissociative 
Disorders, or Borderline Personality 
Disorder, likewise typically have significant 
autohypnotic components.  The great utility 
of such cases is that they are ‘hard’ — they 
test the limits of any definition when 
reinterpreted as a hypothesis.  My assump-
tion is that, as for anything else in medicine, 
pathology informs normality, and any gen-
eralization about normality is mistaken if it 
fails to embrace pathological cases.  
What do such patients teach us? The pa-
tient may be referred because other people 
have observed them in states which they 
consider globally different, and for which the 
patient may claim amnesia.  On arrival in 
the office, such a patient may begin ‘normal-
ly’ but then appear to enter an altered state 
of consciousness, which resolves only upon 
employing techniques generally considered 
as hypnotic re-alerting.  So the first point to 
be made is that the question of re-alerting 
procedures is as important as the question of 
induction procedures.  
When equal attention is paid to re-alert-
ing to the present, then a number of issues 
can be further parsed in the question of 
definitions of hypnosis.  Hypnotizability can 
intend two independent variables: ease and 
speed of entering an altered state, and the 
depth achieved — even if the two often cova-
ry.  A patient may require a long and onerous 
induction to enter a hypnotic state, but then 
appear to be in very deep hypnotic trance, 
not only because of what is accomplished 
in that state, but also in the long and oner-
ous re-alerting required to bring the patient 
back to the here and now.  Again, objective 
measures may one day clarify differences 
between ‘easy shallow’ hypnotizability and 
‘arduous deep’ hypnotizability.  
Suggestion
The paper points out that suggestion has 
four interrelated but remarkably distinct ap-
plications: 1. Suggestibility independent of 
hypnosis; 2. Suggestions made in the course 
of any hypnotic induction; 3. the specific 
suggestion that the hypnotic induction is 
hypnotic; 4. Suggestibility once the subject is 
in the hypnotic state.  I found the research 
on suggestion #3 especially interesting, and 
deal with this below under ‘Placebo effect’.  
I am struck by the ubiquity of ‘sugges-
tion’ throughout the paper, as if hypnosis 
can’t be addressed except in the context of 
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suggestion, and as if the discussion were lim-
ited to ‘normal’ subjects.  I wondered if the 
author’s concerns reflect the research world 
of hypnosis quite distinct from the clinical 
world of hypnosis.  
I certainly recognize that I routinely use 
suggestion #3 — the suggestion that the in-
duction I use will be a hypnotic induction, 
but I also endorse the well-known clinical 
adage that “all hypnosis is self-hypnosis”.  In 
the cases I treat, many of the milder cases 
require formal hypnotic inductions with 
their usual suggestions (or invitations) for 
relaxation, cataplexy, visualization, etc., 
whereas more severe cases may merely call 
for my ‘permission’ to enter an altered state 
at a given point in the session.  And I specifi-
cally promote competence in self-hypnosis 
in all cases that need it; I judge it preferable 
for someone in emotional turmoil, between 
sessions, to calm themselves autonomously 
rather than to rely on popping a pill.  So any 
patient who has been in treatment with me 
for any length of time will dispense with the 
formal induction (and its suggestions), and 
enter the altered state when the appropriate 
moment arrives.  
Once in the hypnotic state, suggestion is 
generally a decreasing part of the therapeutic 
work.  At the outset, invitations to visualize 
are common (e.g., a special or safe place; a 
workroom), and patients may be almost 
magically suggestible with regard to various 
peripheral details of hypnotic imagination 
but at the same time utterly impervious to 
any suggestion which tries to bypass or ne-
gate the core of the pathology.  If they were 
globally ‘suggestible’ in the conventional 
sense, then they could be easily suggested 
back to mental health.  Not at all the case! 
Suggestion is subordinated to the general 
therapeutic ethos, and this leaves it by the 
wayside, as regards the core of hypnosis.
Placebo effect
I interpret the increased response of sub-
jects who are told that the induction they 
are about to undergo is a hypnotic one as a 
placebo effect — the effect of what the word 
‘hypnosis’ connotes to the subject.  Similarly, 
it would be interesting to see whether a sub-
set of subjects have a nocebo effect to the sug-
gestion — a specific inhibition to entering an 
altered state when told that this is the intent. 
These are interesting and testable questions. 
In conclusion, I thank Wagstaff for his 
clarity and exhaustive survey of the litera-
ture, and look forward to further debate 
about these fundamental issues.  
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